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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“After decades when we thought we had successfully outlawed the use of chemical and 
biological weapons, the world is sitting idly by while their use is becoming normalised in 
Syria”, responded the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, after 
the Douma chemical attacks (Shaheen, 2018). On April 7, 2018, the rebel-held town in Eastern 
Ghouta, near Damascus, was attacked. Approximately 500 people who visited the medical 
facilities after the attack showed signs and symptoms closely related to the exposure of toxic 
chemicals. The World Health Organization reported that 43 people have died from these 
symptoms (WHO, 2018). The Syrian government stated it is not responsible for the attack on 
the last holdout that was under opposition control despite allegations from Western powers. 
Shortly after the Douma attack, missile strikes by the United States, France and the United 
Kingdom hit sites that were connected to the Syrian government’s chemical weapons 
programme (BBC, 2018b).  
 The Douma attack is just one example of the many violent outbursts in the Syrian 
conflict. After the first seven years of conflict, more than half of the Syrian population has been 
forced to flee. Over six million Syrians are internally displaced and more than 5,5 million have 
fled their homes and sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Even though Lebanon, Jordan, 
Turkey, Iraq and Egypt host the majority of the refugees, other parts of the world have also 
experienced a large influx of refugees, such as the European Union. In 2017, around 725,000 
Syrians returned to their homes. Of those returning home about 70,000 returned from the 
neighbouring countries, whereas 655,000 refugees had been displaced inside the country. 
Nonetheless, 1,8 million Syrians were still internally displaced in that same year. Almost an 
entire generation is growing up in extreme poverty without access to education (UNHCR, 
2018). With more than half a million deaths and over 11 million refugees, the war in Syria is 
one of the largest post-Second World War tragedies in the peace and security domain 
(Clingendael Spectator, 2018).  
 The Syrian conflict is entering its 9th year in March 2019. The conflict started with 
large-scale protests, inspired by the (successful) Arab Spring uprisings, by Syrian civilians who 
demanded democratic reforms in 2011. The Syrian government, led by President al-Assad, 
responded to the uprisings with violence: demonstrators were killed and even more were 
imprisoned. With the formation of the Free Syrian Army, a loose faction founded by officers 
of the Syrian Armed Forces with the aim of overthrowing the government, uprisings started to 
escalate into a civil war (Al Jazeera News, 2018). President Obama announced in August 2012 
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that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would be a red line. Syria’s chemical weapons 
activities would change the US military response. Despite the allegedly use of chemical 
weapons by the Assad regime in December 2012 in Homs, and the larger attacks in March 2013 
in Aleppo and Damascus, Obama withheld from any direct military action even though the 
chemical red line had been crossed. Other incidents, such as the August 2013 Ghouta chemical 
weapons attack, were further discussed in the United National Security Council (UNSC) 
(Sanders-Zakre, 2018). The civil war slowly unfolded into a larger regional and international 
conflict. The rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the anti-IS coalition contributed to that. The anti-
IS coalition, with the US as its leader and other countries as international coalition partners, 
started bombing IS targets in 2014. In addition, the coalition began to arm and support anti-
Assad rebel groups (Al Jazeera News, 2018). 
 The Syrian conflict is fed by three different campaigns: the violence between the Syrian 
government and other Syrian opposition forces, the Turkish military operations against the 
Syrian Kurds, and the efforts of the US-led international coalition to defeat IS. Even though it 
seems that the violence of the Syrian government and the opposition forces is a national issue, 
the two parties are supported by international actors. To exemplify, the anti-government rebel 
groups are backed by the US and Turkey, whereas Russia and Iran support al-Assad and the 
Syrian government (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Due to the involvement of major 
international actors and existing alliances, this Syrian conflict is not purely a national or 
regional conflict, but an international one. For instance, the Syrian government held less than a 
fifth of Syria’s territory before the start of Russia’s military engagement in September 2015. 
The Russian airstrikes turned the tides of the al-Assad regime (Perry & Bassam, 2018). Several 
rounds of peace negotiations in Geneva and Astana have not yet been successful in ending the 
conflict. In addition, Western-backed resolutions on Syria in the UNSC have been vetoed 
numerous times by Russia and China (Al Jazeera News, 2018).  
 The long-lasting hostilities still continue today. One reason that could serve as an 
explanation for this enduring conflict is the complexity of the alliances in the Syrian conflict. 
This thesis aims to investigate how the relationship between two main actors, namely the US 
and Russia, has played out in the UNSC. The five permanent members of the UNSC, the United 
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China, have a central role in resolving the 
Syrian conflict. A resolution does not pass in the UNSC with a veto of any of these permanent 
members. So far, the Council has failed in its primary responsibility to maintain international 
peace and security, in particular with regards to the Syrian conflict. The Council is not unified 
on the Syrian topic and therefore cannot be effective (Nadin, 2017). In an attempt to overcome 
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the UNSC’s deadlock and deep divisions on the subject, talks were held in Sweden instead of 
in New York City in April 2018. The long-term role of the Council and the United Nations in 
general were also on the agenda (BBC, 2018a).  
 The research question this master’s thesis aims to answer is: how are the US-Russian 
relations in the UNSC on the Syrian conflict from March 2011-June 2018? In a heightened 
atmosphere in international relations, with the US still striving for hegemony and a more 
assertive Russian foreign policy, it is important to find out if more room for cooperation 
between the two countries exists within the UNSC framework. The US and Russia are in 
conflict with each other over the Syrian space which serves as fuel for a dangerous climate in 
the bilateral relations. It is vital to understand the relations between the two countries. This 
thesis looks at the rhetoric of the two countries over a long period of time by analysing almost 
the entire length of the conflict (until mid-2018). Consistencies or inconsistencies in the 
countries’ foreign policy will also be detected. A systematic analysis of the UNSC minutes on 
the Syrian conflict, in particular focussed on the US and Russia, has not yet been conducted. 
The added value of this thesis lies in that contribution to the academic literature. An answer to 
the research questions will be found by coding and categorising the documents across the 
entirety of the war. 
 This thesis will firstly provide a literature review which delves into the US-Russian 
relations and the countries’ involvement in Syria and the wider Middle East. In addition, it 
elaborates on the existing literature regarding the US-Russian relations in the UNSC. Secondly, 
the methods and methodology chapter will be provided. Thirdly, the analysis of the US and 
Russian account in the UNSC meetings will be elaborated on. This empirical part consists of 
three main chapters focusing on chemical weapons, humanitarian assistance, and the political 
level, such as the position of al-Assad. Finally, this thesis provides a coherent answer to the 
research question in the conclusion and elaborates on the limitations of this study and provides 
suggestions for future research. The expected conclusion of this study is that the US and Russian 
policies have been more inconsistent throughout the years and that there is more room for 
cooperation than one would initially think.  
 
  
US-Russia Relations in the UNSC on Syria       10 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The relationship between the US and Russia is a dynamic and complicated one. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, relations between the two countries were generally 
warm. Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s cracks in the relationship began to 
surface. With the first two presidencies of Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush, tensions arose. 
Putin showed a more assertive foreign policy, whereas Bush, especially after the 9/11 attacks, 
took a more unilateral approach in the US foreign policy (Sakwa, 2008; Ditrych, 2014). The 
gradual deterioration of the more positive times in the first years of the post-Cold War era 
picked up pace in Putin’s second term. Putin’s 2007 Munich speech marks the turning point in 
the US-Russia relations as Putin accused the US heavily by stating the US provoked a new 
nuclear arms race and has overstepped its national borders. Putin in particular refers to the 
“unilateral” and “illegitimate” American military actions which did not create more stability 
(Shanker & Landler, 2007). An example of this is the 2003 Iraq invasion. Despite their 
opposition, Russia did not veto UNSC Resolution 1441. This resolution was unanimously 
adopted and states that Iraq is in “material breach” of its other obligations under previous UNSC 
resolutions. According to Jervis (2005), Russia endorsed the resolution as a result of the position 
that the US has put them in. The US would pursue the war in any format - with or without the 
support of the UNSC - and “endorsing the war was the best choice in order to maintain the 
possibility of influencing the United States and keeping up the appearance that it was not acting 
unilaterally” (pp. 69-70). Russia perceived that action in a particular way.  
This is in line with Jervis’ argumentation. Decision-makers interpret information in a 
certain fashion. Often misperceptions are not the exception, but the normal state of psychology. 
Information and actions are seen from a certain perspective and due to this subjectivity, not 
everyone will perceive the information in the same fashion. Leaders are likely to fit the 
incoming information into their own existing images and ideas which influences what they 
notice and pick up from the information (Jervis, 1976). Attempts have been made to overcome 
the misinterpretations in the US-Russia relations. With the Obama-Medvedev Commission 
launched in July 2009, which aims to improve cooperation between the US and Russia on a 
wide range of shared interests, hope for a better relationship between the two powers increased 
(Rojansky, 2010); though, the crisis in Syria put an additional strain on the US-Russia relations. 
This literature review will firstly further examine the key moments in the US-Russia 
relations since 2011 to see what other events, apart from the involvement in Syria, affected the 
relationship. Secondly, both the US and Russian foreign policy in the wider Middle East and 
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more specifically in Syria will be described. Lastly, a short overview of the current academic 
literature on the UNSC involvement in Syria will be given. These subtopics are vital to 
understand the context in which both actors operate and identify how the policies of the  US 
and Russia differ. 
 
Key Moments in US-Russia Relations Since 2011 
A review of the literature focused on US-Russia relations reveals that the relationship has, in 
the post-Cold War era, been a troubled one, with scholars evidencing both cooperation and 
conflict. The two countries share numerous interests, such as nuclear security, countering 
terrorism and exploring outer space. Cooperation between the two powers is vital as the 
implications of their relationship impacts the international system (CSIS, 2018). However, 
various crises have brought the bilateral relationship into rough waters. Events other than just 
the Syrian crisis have contributed to this, as various scholars make clear. For instance, after the 
2008 US-Polish agreement on the stationing of US missiles in Poland and the 2008 Russia-
Georgia war, bilateral relations between the US and Russia deteriorated rapidly (Ratti, 2013). 
President Obama first attempted to reset the relations in 2009. This new US policy was soon 
followed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO followed the US lines as 
the relationship between NATO and Russia had become sour too. This is largely attributed to 
the large 2004 NATO expansion in which European states mostly sought US protection from 
Russia. Despite their new status as NATO members, Eastern European states continued to fear 
Russia’s assertive policy (Ratti, 2013; Braun, 2012). However, the attempt to be on friendly 
terms failed again. From the start in the negotiations, NATO did not see Russia as an equal 
partner, and Russia did not accept their “junior partner status”. Russia wanted to be treated as 
an equal partner, but the country perceived that they are being marginalised in the negotiations. 
The (mis)perception influenced the negotiations, which resulted in a no-deal. The Russian idea 
of a new organisation that would replace NATO and include Russia as a full member was not 
favourable to NATO members (Ratti, 2013).  
 One of the most notable crises since 2011 is the Ukrainian crisis. The literature describes 
the US response to Russian aggression and how the response again resulted in the deterioration  
of the bilateral relationship. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 by Russia and the following 
crisis in Ukraine is according to Ditrych (2014) the “most serious crisis [between the two great 
powers] since the end of the Cold War” (p. 76). Over recent years, Moscow has sought to 
establish itself more as a great power in the international arena and tried to decrease the US 
hegemony militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The Russian actions in Crimea must be 
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seen in this context (Ditrych, 2014). The US sanctions, which were coordinated with the 
European Union, following the annexation of Crimea have been a key element in the US foreign 
policy vis-à-vis Russia. The goal of the sanctions is to target the Russian economy and 
individuals who have close relations to the Kremlin. In addition to the Crimea-related sanctions, 
the US has taken other measures, such as diplomatic pressure (Weiss & Nephew, 2016). Ditrych 
(2014) strongly believes that the US and its allies should continue negotiations with Moscow, 
but solely as part of a new containment strategy to minimise Russia’s expansionist activities 
and not as part of a ‘reset’ policy (p. 95). Another event that puts pressure on the US-Russia 
relationship is the Russian hostile state activity in the US presidential election in 2016. The 
Russian social media strategy attempted to undermine the confidence in the national election 
and the amplify more attention to critical stories about Hillary Clinton (Persily, 2017). The 
literature is divided in terms of those who focus on the role of Russia in undermining US-Russia 
relations and those who concentrate on the US behaviour and its effects. All in all, these events 
turned the tables of the US-Russia relationship. The traditional mistrust and fear surfaced again 
and makes collaboration on a different significant topic, ending the Syrian crisis, challenging. 
 
US Foreign Policy in the Middle East and Syria 
Since the beginning of Obama’s first term, the US strategic interests in the Middle East have 
remained essentially unchanged, but the means that the US is willing to use to maintain their 
influence in the region are different. Domestically, Obama had to deal with the legacy left by 
Bush: costly military engagements in the region, i.e. in Afghanistan and Iraq, austerity measures 
and public war fatigue. Geostrategically,  the transition to an a-polar world, blurred lines 
between state and non-state actors, and preventive military intervention, challenge the US 
foreign policy in the Middle East. Despite the strong military power of the US, Obama preferred 
a strategy that focused on human and technological surrogates (Krieg, 2016). Surrogate warfare 
is a “patron’s externalization, partially or wholly, of the strategic, operational and tactical 
burden of warfare to a human or technological surrogate with the principal intent of minimizing 
the burden of warfare for its own taxpayers, policy-makers and military” (Krieg, 2016, p. 99). 
In short, this means that the US has steered away from the expansive foreign policy under Bush, 
and that - in case of military action - the strategic and operational burden should be shared in a 
multilateral context. Additionally, soft power became more part of the foreign and security 
policy (Krieg, 2016). Contrary to Obama, Trump has showed a preference for stronger regional 
partnership with Saudi Arabia, a closer friendship with Israel, and a more anti-Iran sentiment. 
The current Trump administration has also increased the number and frequency of US air and 
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drone strikes (Black, 2018). It seems that Obama’s “leading from behind” strategy is not 
Trump’s motto.  
The Bush legacy was interpreted differently by Obama than by Trump. The legacy of 
past actions is construed differently by the leader in question. The scholarly debate of 
perception comes into play, but also the agent vs structure debate (Wendt, 1987). For Obama, 
the legacy of past actions was a structural constraint. This means that this structure influenced 
or limited the choices and opportunities of Obama vis-à-vis his foreign policy. Contrarily, 
Trump was less constrained and acted independently and made his own choice, which was free 
of past constraints. The level of constraint shown explains a political affect or outcome (Hay, 
2002). 
In Syria, the Obama administration also showed less military involvement than initially 
anticipated. In 2012, Obama mentioned that if al-Assad would use chemical weapons, it would 
cross a red line and would invoke US military action. Even after the chemical attacks on rebel-
controlled areas of Damascus by the Syrian military, Obama waited with his military response 
(Chollet, 2016). After the intervention in Libya under the banner of “responsibility to protect” 
(R2P), the US has been reluctant to intervene in Syria. Despite the atrocities, intervening in the 
name of human rights proved to be difficult as the cost and complexity of the deployment of 
US ground troops is expected to be rather high (Mendelsohn, 2014). The humanitarian crisis in 
Syria has been condemned by the Obama administration; however, the president failed to 
mobilise sufficient public support to justify the intervention. It seems that the US has shifted its 
position in the Middle East: from being a world police and protector to being a partner. Regional 
actors act as surrogates and have the ownership of providing their own security in the region 
(Krieg, 2016).  
 
Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East and Syria  
Debates in the literature show the heightened interest of Russia on the world stage. With 
Moscow’s withdrawal from the Middle East, the importance of the region declined under 
President Mikhail Gorbachev. However, a renewed interest in the Middle East surfaced during 
Putin’s term. Russia has reappeared as a key player in the geographically close region and tries 
to restore its position as a significant power on the world stage through its action in the Middle 
East. In addition, other main political objectives of Putin’s foreign policy in the Middle East 
are: containing and reducing Islamist radicalism and extremism, seeking long-lasting alliances 
in the region with friendly regimes, and establishing military presence in the region. Moreover, 
economic reasons such as attracting foreign investments from the Gulf region and coordinating 
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energy policies with oil and gas producers also play a role. Contrary to the US, Russia has 
different key partners in the region, such as Iran (Trenin, 2016). 
 Since the re-election of Putin as president in 2012, the Kremlin has had a more assertive 
foreign policy towards the Middle East and increased its presence in the region. By intensifying 
its contacts with the dominant countries in the Middle East, Moscow hoped to avoid 
international isolation as a result of the imposed sanctions by the West. Additionally, by 
presenting itself as a more active player in the Middle East, Russia demonstrated that it plays a 
crucial role in international conflicts and issues (Kozhanov, 2018). Russia’s renewed interest in 
the region also became notable when the Russian launched airstrikes in September 2015 hit 
groups opposing al-Assad in Syria (Kozhanov, 2018).  
 Russia and Syria have been on a friendly footing since the 1950s. Russia’s involvement 
in Syria demonstrates this good relationship. Moscow supports al-Assad against destabilizing 
forces, such as the US-led support for regime change. However, Russia’s engagement has wider 
geopolitical reasons as well. Geographically, Syria lies between Moscow’s allies and influence 
in the country would form a new axis (Trenin, 2016). The refusal to support UN actions against 
the al-Assad regime also has pragmatic roots: the Syrian regime imports arms from Russia 
(Stent, 2012). Ultimately, through its vital role in the Syrian conflict, Russia wants that its voice 
is being heard and is taken seriously as an international player (Kozhanov, 2018). Russia’s 
diplomatic and military weight should not be ignored.  
 The underlying reasons for Russia’s involvement are different than that of the US. The 
country also puts an emphasis on national sovereignty as the fundamental basis for the 
international order. The general western scholarship perceives that the western-led norms of 
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect are running counter to Russia’s 
foreign policy. One of the arguments made is that the state itself must bear the responsibility 
and guarantee the order in its own country - without foreign interference. Nonetheless, some 
scholars argue that Russia’s statist international legal framework does not exclude humanitarian 
considerations and R2P, it is Russia’s view of the means of implementation that is diverging: 
Moscow is against forcible intervention, but in favour of action by responsible actors that 
respect the national sovereignty (Averre & Davies, 2015). 
 
US-Russia Involvement in Syria in the UNSC 
The two powers show opposing ideological approaches in their foreign policy. On the one hand, 
the US stresses two crucial principles: humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to 
protect. On the other hand, Russia puts an emphasis on non-interference and state sovereignty 
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(Stent, 2012). Even more, the civil conflict in Syria has turned into a proxy war between the 
two and other powers. Moscow pursues its geopolitical interests in the region and, at the same 
time, tries to limit the US influence in the region (Ditrych, 2014). The two countries are 
irreversibly involved in the region. Both players have their own goals and strategies, which 
leads to areas of cooperation and conflict.  
 Debates on the voting behaviour of the US and Russia have already surfaced. Odeyemi 
(2016) shows that the support of the BRICS countries regarding R2P is vital. The voting 
behaviour of these countries are guided by three principles: military intervention is not 
acceptable, any intervention in Syria has to be seen in light of the Libyan experience, and draft 
resolutions from the P3 members (the US, United Kingdom, and France) mostly put pressure 
on the al-Assad regime without giving the same accusatory tone to the rebels regarding the 
violations of human rights. Consequently, the divide in the UNSC could not be more present 
(p. 142). The P2 (Russia and China) vetoes in the UNSC regarding Syria show the countries 
positions and interests should be taken into account in world politics. However, the West argues 
that these vetoes are a way for Russia and China to block and overthrow the UN system 
(Chaziza, 2014). 
To conclude, the US-Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict centres around several 
principles: sovereignty, non-interference, humanitarian assistance, and R2P. These guiding 
principles have affected the foreign policy of the two countries in the world and in the Middle 
East in particular. Debates in the literature have shown that on these topics, cooperation between 
the two countries is not always easy at hand. The representatives could misinterpret and 
misperceive statements that are made and adapt their policy on these interpretations. There has 
not yet been a systematic academic analysis that focuses on the different principles from the 
start of the Syrian conflict until June 2018. This thesis aims to bridge that particular gap and 
tries to show where more room for cooperation is possible, if policies have been consistent, and 
how the agents are vital in the decision-making. A systematic account of the US and Russian 
engagement in the UNSC on the topic of Syria will be given which shows whether the 
underlying themes, such as sovereignty and humanitarian assistance, indeed form the basis of 
their policy in the UNSC. Moreover, this research aims to investigate if the US and Russia have 
been inconsistent in their policies and whether more areas of cooperation in the Syrian context 
can be identified. This would show the state of US-Russian relations in the UNSC in regards to 
the Syrian conflict. The next chapter will focus on how the data has been analysed.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Methods 
The goal of this research is to see how the United States and Russia behaved in the UNSC 
meetings with regards to the Syrian conflict. This research looks primarily for evidence of 
whether a policy change can be detected when leadership changed, for instance, the US 
presidency. In order to see whether changes are present and how the US and Russia respond to 
and deal with the Syrian conflict, a mixed-methods approach is employed in this thesis: both 
quantitative and qualitative methods are applied.  
  Throughout this thesis, primary and secondary sources are relied on. On the one hand, 
the primary sources mostly consists of the minutes of the UNSC meetings on Syria. On the 
other hand, secondary sources are comprised of articles from renowned think tanks, newspaper 
articles, and academic literature. The academic literature is vital in developing an understanding 
of the context surrounding the UNSC meetings on Syria. The primary data is gathered from the 
research website of the United Nations. The UN Documentation Research Guide offers an 
overview of the meetings and outcomes of the UNSC from 1994 onwards. The records are listed 
in reverse chronological order and are freely accessible to the public. For this thesis, meetings 
records and outcomes from March 2011 until June 2018 are used which enables the author to 
draw conclusions that are not limited to solely one year, but to the entirety of the war until June 
2018. As seen in figure 1, representatives of the UNSC meet to discuss a particular topic, for 
example “the situation concerning Iraq” or “peace consolidation in West Africa”.  
Figure 1: Overview of meetings conducted by the Security Council in 2018 (UNSC, 2018).  
 
The Syrian conflict is mainly discussed under the topics “The situation in the Middle East” and 
“The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”. Other topics that are also 
heavily discussed under this theme are the war in Yemen and the Israel-Palestine conflict. The 
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Syrian conflict is to a certain extent also discussed during meetings on “threats to international 
peace and security by terrorist acts” and “non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”. 
However, meeting records of these topics are not always available due to consistent error 
notifications and it is therefore not possible to check whether the Syrian conflict is discussed in 
those meetings. In addition, meetings on the Middle East serve as the main platform for 
discussions on the Syrian conflict and the use of chemical weapons and threat of ISIS are also 
debated during those meetings. Consequently, data is only drawn from the first two mentioned 
topics.  
  The meetings records will solely include those in which either or both the US and 
Russian representative spoke as this research looks at the interaction of the two countries. The 
interaction can be direct, by asking for instance questions, or indirect, by referring to the other 
country in a speech. If neither of the representatives spoke in the meetings, then the interaction 
between the two countries is not present and thus excluded from the data set. These meetings 
are often briefings by a UN representative on the situation in Syria. This also accounts for the 
meetings in which either the US or Russian representative spoke in their role as president and 
thus chairing the meetings. Additionally, the meetings outcomes – presidential statements, 
resolutions, and draft resolutions, will also be analysed. The outcomes show the 
(dis)agreements of the UNSC on the Syrian conflict.  
  In total, 137 UNSC documents were analysed . As the first four years of the conflict are 
relatively contained as a national conflict, the UNSC did not have the topic high on the agenda. 
From 2015 onwards, the Syrian conflict gained a more “secure” spot on the agenda. As a result, 
less data is available for the first years of the conflict. The data collection ends in June 2018. 
June marks a two-month period after the Douma attacks in April 2018 and therefore the attacks 
can still be taken into account in the analysis. Table 1 (see next page) presents a short overview 
of how many documents were analysed in what year.  
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Year Presidential 
statements 
(outcome) 
Resolutions 
(outcome) 
Draft 
resolutions 
(outcome) 
Syrian conflict 
mentioned in 
UNSC meetings, 
but not discussed 
by US or Russia  
Meetings 
records 
analysed  
2011 1 0 1 7 3 
2012 3 3 2 15 7 
2013 1 1 0 19 2 
2014 0 3 1 12 6 
2015 3 4 0 19 11 
2016 2 8 3 13 23 
2017 0 1 6 13 19 
2018 0 1 3 3 19 
Total 10 21 16 101 90 
Table 1: An overview of the amount of documents in which the Syrian conflict has been 
mentioned in the UNSC meetings and output of those meetings. 
 
  In this case, a document analysis will be applied to the UNSC meeting records. 
Documents can have a variety of purposes in research, such as tracking change or development 
(Bowen, 2009). Given this is the purpose of this thesis, a document analysis is an appropriate 
methodology to employ. Bowen further describes such an analysis as a “systematic procedure 
for reviewing or evaluating documents – both printed and electronic […] material” (Bowen, 
2009, p. 27). The procedure consists of multiple steps. The finding and selection procedures 
have already been outlined above. The next step will be to ensure the contents of the documents 
can be analysed in a comparative fashion. This is achieved by delivering a hybrid form of 
content analysis. Content analysis most often takes a purely quantitative form but this can be 
allied with a qualitative analysis and that is what is conducted here. The advantage of a 
qualitative approach is that it can provide details and extensive descriptions of phenomena, 
which do not result from a purely quantitative analysis (Abbott & McKinney, 2013).  
  Woodrum (1984) used the definition of Stone and Holsti, two leading scholars in content 
analysis methodology, to explain content analysis as “any technique for marking inferences by 
objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” (p. 2). Several 
advantages of using content analysis for this research project are: 1) the research technique can 
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be broadly applied to analysing cultural phenomena as an empirical method, such as to study 
political discourse, 2) content analysis is focussed on communication, particularly in 
recognising symbolic message patterns between the communicating parties, and 3) this type of 
analysis forces the researcher to stipulate category criteria, which means the researcher 
investigates the texts in-depth and looks beyond the generalisations (Woodrum, 1984). The 
hermeneutic understanding of the texts tries to explain the exploratory research question. By 
understanding the complex historical context of the data, the texts are interpreted on a higher, 
less superficial, level (Bos & Tarnai, 1999). Coding and categorising are a common features of 
qualitative content analysis. This type of content analysis is used to systematically transform 
large quantities of text into concise results (Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017).  
  The first step of the analysis process is preparing the data for analysis. After an initial 
reading, the information will be organised into different categories related to the research 
question (Bowen, 2009). This means that all the meeting records are scanned for their relevance, 
i.e. if representatives of the respective countries speak. After this, the speeches will be coded. 
Coding the documents will assist in revealing dominant patterns. The first phase of coding will 
be open coding, which assigns labels to fragments of text. The second phase will be axial 
coding, which compares all the codes to each other. In this way, overlapping concepts are 
detected and transcending codes created. Through this system of coding, the most important 
topics will become evident (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). These steps of analysis are 
part of a reflective process: coding and categorising are a continuous process. The codes serve 
as labels which will be grouped together in different categories. Codes that are closely related 
to each other, either through context or content, are grouped in the same category (Erlingsson 
& Brysiewicz, 2017). Categories can be generated in a deductive manner and in inductive 
manner (Woodrum, 1984; Bos & Tarnai, 1999). In this case, both have been applied. From the 
literature review some categories have been established, such as “sovereignty”, “humanitarian 
assistance”, and “responsibility to protect”. These categories are established deductively. Other 
categories that emerged from the data, such as “chemical weapons”, are established inductively. 
All in all, the categories are best fitted into three different categories: chemical weapons, 
humanitarian level, and political level. These categories also form the basis of the empirical 
chapter of the thesis. 
  As already set out, quantitative methods will also be used. Content analysis serves as a 
link between qualitative symbol usage with quantitative data. By systematically transforming 
large texts into smaller texts and eventually into codes and categories, the texts can be analysed 
in a quantitative manner. Through content analysis, characteristics of communications are 
US-Russia Relations in the UNSC on Syria       20 
 
measured. To illustrate, one can count the word frequencies or identify the symbolic meanings 
or identify the thematic interrelations (Woodrum, 1984). The quantitative aspect to this study 
will merely consist of counting. For instance, through the content analysis it will become 
apparent how often a particular delegation voted in favour or against a resolution.  
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Chapter 4: The Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria 
One of the widely discussed topics in the UNSC on Syria is the use of chemical weapons. Since 
September 12, 2013 Syria is party to the arms control treaty, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, which entered into force in 1997 (Sanders-Zakre, 2018). The convention prohibits 
the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and regulated the 
destruction of existing chemical weapons. Except for Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South 
Sudan, all other UN states are parties to the treaty. The Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) administers the treaty (OPCW, 2019). Despite its prohibition, the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, an independent 
body established by the UN Human Rights Council, has confirmed at least 34 chemical attacks 
by the Syrian government from 2013 until December 2017 (Almukhtar, 2018). These attacks 
are illustrated by below infographic.  
Infographic 1: Confirmed chemical attacks documented by the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (OHCHR, 2018).  
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This chapter will further delve into topic by first providing a coherent overview of the 
resolutions in the UNSC and how many meetings are centred around chemical weapons. 
Second, both viewpoints and statements from the US and Russia will be discussed. Finally areas 
of (potential) cooperation are explored. 
 
Short Overview of UNSC Documents 
 Chemical weapons have been widely debated in the UNSC; though, we see a upward 
trend over the years. The first time “chemical” is mentioned in the UNSC meetings is July 19, 
2012 (UNSC, 2012, July 19)1. This was well-before one of the first confirmed chemical attacks 
in Syria which took place in March 2013. The first UNSC resolution on chemical weapons 
passed on September 27, 2013. Resolution 2118 was unanimously adopted by the UNSC and 
laid out the procedures for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. Other resolutions that 
have been adopted are Resolution 2209 (March 2015), Resolution 2235 (August 2015), 
Resolution 2314 (October 2016) and Resolution 2319 (November 2016). The resolutions deal 
with the condemnation of any use of chlorine as a chemical weapon in Syria and the 
establishment of a Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) of the United Nations and the OPCW 
to identify the perpetrators who are involved in the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the 
extensions of JIM respectively. Table 2 provides an overview of how many times the use of 
chemical weapons was discussed in the UNSC. The numbers represent in how many documents 
“chemical” has been mentioned, often relating to the OPCW, chemical weapons, chemical 
facilities, chemical disarmament or chemical materials. The use of chemical weapons was not 
discussed extensively in all meetings. In 33 out of 67 meetings the word “chemical” was used 
10 times or less.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 When referring to UNSC documents, the reference will be as followed: “UNSC, year, month, day”. As there are 
many documents of the same year, it would be less clear if the reference “UNSC, year and letter” would be used. 
For instance, referring to a meeting on September 27, 2013 would be: UNSC, 2017, September 27 instead of 
UNSC, 2017a. In addition, references to the outcomes (presidential statements, draft resolutions and resolutions) 
are made clear by adding “doc” at the end of the reference. This is clarify to what exactly is referred to: either the 
text of the resolution – the doc – or to the discussion – which are the minutes of the meeting.  
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 Presidential 
statements 
Resolutions Draft 
resolutions 
Meeting records 
2011 0 0 0 0 
2012 0 0 0 1 
2013 1 1 0 2 
2014 0 0 0 6 
2015 0 2 0 10 
2016 0 2 0 14 
2017 0 0 5 17 
2018 0 0 3 17 
Total 1 5 8 67 
  Table 2: An overview of the amount of documents in which “chemical” has been mentioned. 
 
Failing to Prevent the Mass Atrocities in Syria: The Use of Chemical Weapons  
2012-2013: Stepping Stone to Cooperation 
On July 19, 2012,  Ms. Rice, former US ambassador to the UN from January 26, 2009 – June 
30, 2013, argues that the potential use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against its 
own people should be a concern for the UNSC and the large stockpiles should remain clear 
(UNSC, 2012, July 19). After this, a year of silence in the Middle East meetings occurred. The 
discussion about and anonymous adoption of Resolution 2118 on September 27, 2013 sparked 
new insights on the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Resolution 2118 welcomed the 
Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons initiative by the US and Russia which 
showed the commitment to the immediate international control over Syria’s chemical weapons 
and related items. In addition, the resolution condemned the use of chemical weapons by the 
Syrian regime and argued that this is in violation of international law. The individuals that are 
responsible for the use of those chemical weapons in Syria should be held accountable (UNSC, 
2013, September 27, doc). The US and Russia were presented by their respective Foreign 
Affairs ministers – Lavrov and Kerry – which showed the importance of this resolution. Kerry 
reaffirmed that responsibility to “defend the defenceless” and thanked Lavrov for “his personal 
efforts and cooperation beginning before Geneva and continuing through this week so that we 
could find common ground” (UNSC, 2013, September 27, pp. 4-5). Through these diplomatic 
efforts, an option of military force had been avoided, according to Kerry. For the first time in 
the UNSC, binding obligations had been placed on the al-Assad regime, and this text reflects 
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what the presidents of the US and Russia had hoped. In contrast to Kerry, Lavrov mentioned 
the importance of the professional and impartial behaviour of OPCW and UN experts and their 
full respect of Syria’s sovereignty when destructing Syria’s chemical weapons. Additionally, 
all parties, especially the regional actors, must report any attempts by non-state actors to acquire 
chemical weapons to the UNSC. Other representatives welcomed the US-Russia accord and 
cooperation (UNSC, 2013, September 27). Lavrov underscored Russia’s commitment of 
finding a political and diplomatic settlement whilst working on chemical disarmament (UNSC, 
2013, October 22).  
 
2014: The Continuation of Success 
In April 2014, Lavrov noted with satisfaction that over 92 percent of the chemical agents in 
Syria had been removed by the Syrian authorities. He stressed that the authorities did this under 
difficult security circumstances, which, according to Lavrov, have been ignored by many 
international players. The US ambassador Power was less optimistic. Power referred to 
photographs that depict horrors imposed by the Syrian regime and notes the victims of chemical 
attacks. Power’s called for accountability. The UK supported Power by stating that those 
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity must be held accountable (UNSC, 
2014, April 27). Through the course of 2014, the US and Russia continued to emphasise a 
collective course and one voice. When unity was present in the UNSC, concrete positive results 
had been reached. The aim of Resolution 2118 was reached in July 2014 with the complete 
elimination of all declared chemical weapons of the al-Assad regime (UNSC, 2014, July 14; 
UNSC, 2014, July 22).  
 
2015-2016: Cracks in the Cooperation Despite Adopted Resolutions 
Despite the elimination of all declared chemical weapons, the OPCW released a third report 
with further evidence that chemical weapons had been used against civilians by the Syrian 
government. Power saw this as a violation of international norms and the international legal 
obligations Syria had. In this particular meeting, the Russian ambassador did not refer to the 
use of chemical weapons at all (UNSC, 2015, January 15). On March 6, the second resolution 
regarding chemical weapons in Syria had been adopted: Resolution 2209. Venezuela abstained, 
but all other UNSC members voted in favour of the resolution which strongly condemned the 
use of chlorine gas as a weapon. Power’s statement elaborated on the fact that the al-Assad 
regime had the capabilities to deploy and use chlorine weapons. Taking the floor for the second 
time, Churkin, Russian ambassador to the UN, responds strongly to this statement: “the 
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statement made by the representative of the United States forces me to make rather detailed 
comments, since Ambassador Power cast the situation in such a light as to suggest that the onus 
is exclusively on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic”, adding that “Ambassador 
Power alleged, although she did not state it explicitly, that the Syrian Government was behind 
it [chemical attacks on sarin attack of August 21]. It was not” (UNSC, 2015, March 6, p. 5). 
Churkin believed that the UNSC, in particular the US and UK, should adopt a more professional 
approach and not rush and blame the Syrian government. Power responded again by urging the 
Council members to carefully read the reports by the experts. Churkin finally replied by stating 
that the inaction of the US after the supposed crossing of Obama’s red line by the Syrian regime 
in August 2013 is “very strange”. His logic is that the US president did nothing and therefore 
the al-Assad government did not use chemical weapons (UNSC, 2015, March, p. 7).  
 Another significant step in ending the use of chemical weapons in Syria is the 
unanimous adoption of Resolution 2235 which established JIM. Power said that these steps are 
necessary as, despite the previous efforts, attacks in Syria have continued. To prevent future 
attacks, a mechanism was necessary which would help gather information and point fingers. 
Churkin noted that with the existing mechanisms the question of who used chlorine gas 
remained unanswered as no mandates to identify the perpetrators was given. Earlier statements 
by UNSC representatives were politized. JIM will close that particular gap of accountability if 
the mechanism works impartially, professionally, and objectively (UNSC, 2015, August 7).  
Already before 2016, Russia had indicated that chemical weapons could be used not 
solely by the al-Assad regime, but also by terrorists. This is again stressed by Churkin in May 
2016. The OPCW found genuine evidence of the use of mustard gas and according to Churkin, 
there are serious grounds to believe that the gases are used by terrorists. He is disappointed: “It 
is unfortunate that […] some Western members of the Council, under contrived pretexts, are 
stifling the Russian-Chinese initiative aimed at neutralizing the threat of the production of 
chemical weapons by terrorists in and around Syria” (UNSC, 2016, May 4, p. 11). Countries 
like France, the UK, Japan, Uruguay, and the US continued to reiterated that accountability is 
important. The UNSC must unite in order to bring those responsible to justice. On October 19, 
the US representative stresses this fact by emphasising that JIM had stated that both the al-
Assad regime as well as ISIL (ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, is the alternative 
name for IS) have used chemical weapons. The Council members cannot change the 
conclusions of the investigation, despite some doubts. One should therefore stop debating the 
approach and methodology of JIM and the first steps of the accountability process should be 
made. Again the Russian representative is compelled by this US statement. “The United States 
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is systematically attempting to shield the terrorists by assigning a priori blame to Damascus” 
(UNSC, 2016, October 19, p. 32).  
Despite these allegations, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2314 which 
extends the mandate of JIM. JIM’s scope and nature of further extensions were also discussed 
during the meeting of October 31. The US representative urged that JIM should remain focused 
on Syria. So far, since the creation of JIM, the chemical attacks had been reduced. Contrarily, 
the Russian delegation believed that JIM’s geographic scope should not be limited to Syria and 
should also be focussed on non-state actors in general and terrorists in particular. Churkin adds 
that JIM “is not a toy for yet again enabling someone to criticize the Syrian Government” 
(UNSC, 2016, October 31, p. 3). Shortly after another resolution unanimously passed: 
Resolution 2319 which extends the mandate for JIM for another year. Power commended the 
spirit in which Russia carried out the negotiations. The work of JIM is vital and not complete. 
She added that JIM is the only body that has the mandate to identify the perpetrators. 
Additionally, she stressed that the Council members need to ensure that those who used the 
chemical weapons also faced consequences. The Russian representative noted that the 
resolution text was the outcome of a negotiation marathon between the representatives of the 
US and Russia. He voiced his regret that the Russian efforts, including a draft resolution with 
the Chinese partners, had been repeatedly blocked by some countries. These initiatives drew 
attention to the use of chemical weapons by terrorists. The Russian representative closed by 
encouraging the Council members to set aside any political differences (UNSC, 2016, 
November 17). 
 
2017-2018: The Years of Vetoed and Not Adopted Draft Resolutions 
The year 2017 was marked by failed draft resolutions. Firstly, on February 28 the draft 
resolution 172 was not adopted due to a double veto by Russia and China. Bolivia also voted 
against and three other countries, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kazakhstan, abstained. The draft 
resolution would have imposed sanctions on individuals or entities that play a role in the 
production or use of chemical weapons in Syria. The UK’s representative responded to the 
Russian veto and wondered what other proof was necessary that Moscow favoured the 
protection of the Syrian regime over the Syrian people. The Russian representative replied and 
stated that draft text is offensive and flawed and was based on “Western capitals’ anti-regime 
doctrine” (UNSC, February 2, 2017, p. 6). According to Russia, JIM does not speak about any 
Syrian officials or entities that would justify the sanctions list and JIM’s conclusions are based 
on suspicious sources and that the resolution would levy sanctions against Damascus. Nikki 
US-Russia Relations in the UNSC on Syria       27 
 
Haley, US representative, replied that Russia and China made an outrageous and indefensible 
choice. She believes that they are ignoring the facts and putting their friends in the regime first. 
The vetoing countries did not like the conclusions that can be drawn from the JIM’s report and 
questioned their credibility. Haley wondered why the two respective countries have not 
objected to the investigators during the course of the past year (UNSC, February 2, 2017).  
 Other draft resolutions have also failed. To exemplify, the draft resolution 315 of April 
12, 2017 was vetoed by Russia, Bolivia voted against and three other countries abstained. The 
draft resolution would have condemned the chemical weapons attack in Khan Shaykhun and 
stressed the importance of the accountability of those who used the chemical weapons. Again, 
Russia emphasised that the troika of drafters (US, France, and UK) already named the 
perpetrator (the al-Assad regime) before the attack had been properly investigated. Haley 
replied that by this veto, Russia is further isolating itself in the Council (UNSC, 2017, April 
12). Two other draft resolutions in 2017 – 962 and 970 – were also vetoed by Russia. Draft 
resolution 968 was not adopted as the resolution did not get the required majority. With no 
adoption of any of these resolutions, the mandate of JIM was not extended (UNSC, 2017, 
November 16; UNSC, 2017, November 17). Draft resolutions proposed by Russia in April 2018 
(175 and 322) did not gain a majority support either. The alternative resolution was vetoed by 
Russia (321) (UNSC, 2018, April 10). The UNSC cannot agree upon a new independent 
mechanism that would investigate the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria. 
 
Room for Cooperation? 
Despite best efforts, the use of chemical weapons has not been eliminated. In the first years of 
the Syrian conflict, both the US and Russia agreed on the severity of the chemical weapons 
attacks and that action had to be taken. Accountability was a significant concern for both parties. 
With the establishment of JIM, significant steps were made in order to identify who should be 
held accountable for the mass atrocities in the Syria. However, when discussing which 
individual or entity was accountable, different perspectives surfaced. Many Western countries, 
including the US, believed that the al-Assad regime is responsible for the attacks. In addition, 
ISIL is also to be blamed. Contrary, Russia believed that the outcomes of JIM have not always 
been impartial and objective and it started to question the legitimacy of the JIM process. Russia 
perceived the US view as too one-sided and too focused on the Syrian government. 
Nevertheless, the US representative did name ISIL’s use of chemical weapons occasionally. 
Both the US and Russia agree in the broad sense that perpetrators should be held accountable, 
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but cannot seem to agree how this should be done. Accusations to both countries account are 
being made.  
 So far, the JIM findings did not lead to any accountability. Russia vetoed any referral 
of the Syrian conflict to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Wintour, 2018a). An example 
of this is the veto of draft resolution 348 of 2014, which refers several times to the referral of 
the situation to the ICC (UNSC, 2014, May 22, doc). With this regard, Russia has taken the 
same stance for the past 8 years. The US takes a different position. After al-Assad crossed 
Obama’s red line, the US changed its position and became less hostile towards the ICC. 
Although Obama has not always been vocal about his support of an ICC referral by the UNSC, 
the US did support the draft resolutions regarding this topic (Meeùs, 2014). Given Trump’s 
stance towards international law and international organisation, it is less likely the US would 
support future draft resolutions on the ICC referral (Bellinger III, 2018).  
 The UNSC generally recognised that there is a need for accountability regarding the use 
of chemical weapons in Syria. However, this idea has not yet led to any concrete action. The 
US and Russia could cooperate more and support an independent evidence-gathering 
mechanism. Albeit the renewal of JIM or a new initiative, gathering evidence is vital for the 
future when political circumstances are more amenable to accountability (Edwards & 
Cacciatori, 2018). As the US has not been consistent with their chemical weapons strategy – 
Obama has been more diplomatic, whereas Trump initiated military action – it is vital to set 
aside the political differences in order to end the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Taking into 
account the different strategies of the US presidents, it does matter who is in office. Therefore, 
the UNSC should continue to work on resolutions that surpass the specifics of the accountability 
as there is currently no consensus on this topic in the UNSC.  
 This chapter has shown that the Russian viewpoint with regards to destruction and 
accountability of the use of chemical weapons has been rather consistent throughout the years. 
This is in contrast to the US view as we can see a new line of thought in the Trump 
administration. The inconsistent policies are somewhat reflected in the outcomes of the UNSC 
meetings. There is less agreement on what action should be taken and since Trump took office 
in 2017, no new resolution has been passed (until June 2018). The following chapter will delve 
into the humanitarian aspect of the Syrian conflict.  
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Chapter 5: Humanitarian Assistance in Syria 
After many years of conflict, the humanitarian situation in Syria continues to be critical. One 
of the main ongoing factors in this conflict is the lack of safe, sustained humanitarian access 
that would aid the Syrian people. The Syrian government has been removing crucial items from 
the convoys and imposed bureaucratic hurdles on the humanitarian assistance. By doing so, the 
government is limiting the humanitarian access. The access to humanitarian aid often comes 
after the civilians have been exposed to long periods of deprivation and violence. Critical 
humanitarian assistance has often come too late (Security Council Report, 2018). Humanitarian 
assistance is a widely debated topic in the UNSC. This chapter will firstly give a short overview 
of the resolutions and draft resolutions regarding humanitarian assistance. Secondly, the 
viewpoints and statements from the US and Russian representatives will be elaborated on. 
Particularly regarding the (draft) resolutions on the humanitarian assistance. Lastly, areas of 
(potential) cooperation are identified.  
 
Short Overview of UNSC Documents 
In almost all meetings of the UNSC, humanitarian assistance was part of the debate. Already in 
2011, the topic of humanitarian aid was discussed. In the presidential statement of August 3, 
2011, the Security Council calls “on the Syrian authorities to alleviate the humanitarian 
situation in crisis areas by ceasing the use of force against affected towns, to allow expeditious 
and unhindered access for international agencies and workers, and cooperate fully with the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights” (UNSC, 2011, August 3, p. 1.). Many 
resolutions include some aspects of humanitarian assistance, but some resolutions are more 
explicit than others. Notable resolutions regarding the humanitarian situation in Syria are: 
Resolution 2139 (February 2014), Resolution 2165 (July 2014), Resolution 2268 (February 
2016), Resolution 2332 (December 2016), and Resolution 2336 (December 16). These 
resolutions deal with the access to humanitarian aid, the humanitarian situation in Syria, the 
access to humanitarian workers in Syria, cross-border aid delivery, and the unhindered access 
of humanitarian agencies in Syria respectively. Despite these resolutions and agreement on 
particular topics, as already mentioned, humanitarian aid is hindered by the Syrian government. 
The Syrian population is still in dire need of critical goods. The following sections will look at 
the draft resolutions and resolutions regarding the humanitarian assistance and how the US and 
Russian representatives have dealt with these issues.  
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Humanitarian Assistance Throughout the Years 
2011: The First Need for Cooperation 
The first draft resolution that was vetoed regarding the humanitarian situation in Syria was in 
2011. On October 4, 2011 Russia and China vetoed against draft resolution 612. The draft 
resolution specified that the Syrian government should allow unhindered and sustained access 
for humanitarian aid and organizations, and should welcome the help of the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It furthermore urged the Syrian 
regime to cooperate comprehensively with the UN as the ongoing violence continued and the 
humanitarian needs are present (UNSC, 2011, October 4, doc). Neither the US or Russia further 
specified their opinions on the humanitarian assistance. Other members of the UNSC did: the 
representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Brazil reiterated that humanitarian workers 
should have access to the population, and the representative of South Africa also stated that, 
under international humanitarian and human rights law, the Syrian authorities should facilitate 
access by the UN humanitarian agencies (UNSC, 2011, October 4). 
 
2012-2013: Making Some Progress 
Resolution 2042 (April 2012) and Resolution 2043 (April 2012) also deal with humanitarian 
assistance. Resolutions 2042 reiterated that the Syrian authorities should allow “immediate, full 
and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of assistance” 
(UNSC, 2012, April 14, p. 2, doc). The Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the 
United Nations and the League of Arab States, which is part of Resolution 2042, elaborates on 
the need of timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all affected areas. It further wants to 
include a daily two hour pause in fighting for humanitarian purposes (UNSC, 2012, April 14, 
doc). Resolution 2043 offers the same viewpoints in securing humanitarian assistance (UNSC, 
2012, April 21, doc). US representative Rice, in her statement on Resolution 2043, noticed that 
little progress had been made on the issue of humanitarian access and that an estimated one 
million Syrians are still in need of humanitarian aid and the US patience is running out (UNSC, 
2012, April 21). With two resolutions that refer to the importance of the Syrian people having 
access to humanitarian aid, another draft resolution in 2012 (538) was shut down and vetoed by 
China and Russia. The resolution included the possibility of sanctions on the country if the 
demands of ending the violence were not met (UNSC, 2012, July 19, doc). A presidential 
statement made on October 2, 2013 showed the continued commitment to providing immediate 
humanitarian assistance throughout the whole country (UNSC, 2013, October 2, doc). Both the 
US and Russia agreed on the urgency and necessity of the humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, 
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specifics on how the assistance should be conducted was not specified. For this reason, it was 
relatively easy to come to agreements and details were not yet significant. The willingness of 
both countries and all other UNSC members was sufficient at this stage. 
 
2014: The Long-Overdue Resolution 
Real change came in 2014. More details were discussed and fortunately for the Syrian people 
the UNSC members came to an agreement on the humanitarian assistance. This is most notable 
in Resolution 2139. After a period of intense negotiations, the UNSC finally laid out further 
details around the urgent need to increase humanitarian aid access. By further terms, the UNSC 
demanded that, among other things, all parties in Syria would allow the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance and ensure a rapid, safe, and unhindered evacuation of all civilians who 
wish to leave the country (UNSC, 2014, February 22, doc). In a reaction to the resolution, Power 
emphasised that this resolution was long overdue and that because of previous failures the 
Syrian people did not receive the appropriate assistance. She further continued by stating that 
this resolution was not about politics or ideology, but simply about doing what is necessary for 
the people in desperate need. Power is shocked that this resolution took so long: “It is 
remarkable to the world that it has taken three years for the Security Council to recognize basic 
facts and to call for such basic principles of humanity […]. It is a gross understatement to say 
it should not have taken so long” (UNSC, 2014, February 22, p. 6). Churkin stated that the 
Russian government had taken on a balanced nature regarding this resolution. He emphasised 
that all parties must cooperate with the humanitarian agencies. More room for cooperation was 
possible as Churkin believes that the improvement in the humanitarian situation was only 
possible through political settlement (UNSC, 2014, February 22).  
 In light of this positive change, another resolution was unanimously adopted. Resolution 
2165 authorised (for 180 days) relief delivery across conflict lines and through border crossings. 
This cross-border humanitarian assistance was necessary to ensure that the assistance would 
reach the Syrian population through the most direct routes. In case of non-compliance by any 
Syrian party to this resolution or Resolution 2139, further measures will be taken (UNSC, 2014, 
July 14, doc). The Russian representative stressed that there was no trigger in the resolution text 
that would allow for the use of force in case of non-compliance. Churkin was pleased to see 
that the UNSC took into account the Russian concerns. Russia had consulted with OCHA and 
was assured that Syria’s territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty was respectfully 
maintained. Power emphasised that this resolution would ensure the implementation of 
Resolution 2165, but that the Council should be ready act in case of non-compliance (UNSC, 
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2014, July 14). What one can understand from these resolutions, is that when the values of the 
Russians, namely sovereignty and territorial integrity, are upheld, cooperation within the UNSC 
is possible on such a topic. On December 17, 2014 the Council adopted another resolution on 
the humanitarian assistance. Despite the challenges that the UN and its partners faced in 
delivering aid across borders, the actors that used the routes were authorised to so do for another 
year (UNSC, 2014, December 17, doc).  
 
2015-2016: More Progress? 
In December 2015, the Council adopted Resolution 2258 unanimously. With this, the decisions 
in Resolution 2165 were renewed for another year. Russia supported the draft resolution as they 
believed that the maintenance of cross-border provision of humanitarian assistance was vital to 
accessing people who lived in areas that are not easy to reach. However, the delegation would 
have liked to see more provisions in the resolution. According to the Russian representative, 
the cross-border points were being used for other purposes than humanitarian purposes as 
weapons were crossing the Syrian borders. Samantha Power argued that the humanitarian 
access of millions of people had been denied or restricted and that this resolution was necessary 
to provide life-saving assistance to those who required it (UNSC, 2015, December 22). 
 On October 8, 2016, two draft resolutions did not pass. The draft resolution proposed 
by the Russians (847) was not adopted as only 4 countries voted in favour, 9 against and 2 
abstained. The other draft resolution (846) was vetoed by the Russians. The UNSC failed to 
adopt a resolution in a heated debate on the content and the need for humanitarian intervention 
in Aleppo. Draft resolution 846 would have demanded an immediate halt to the aerial 
bombardments and military flights over Aleppo, an immediate implementation of a cessation 
of hostilities, as well as the immediate, safe and unhindered humanitarian access (UNSC, 
2016a, October 8, doc). Contrary, the Russian text would have also urged an immediate 
cessation of hostilities, but added that all parties prevent support, either in material or financial 
forms, to groups associated with Al-Qaida or ISIL (UNSC, 2016b, October 8, doc). One the 
main reasons why Russia vetoed the draft resolution 846 is because there were some significant 
gaps in the text. It was not evident if the ban on flights also included intelligence flights or 
flights over the western part of Aleppo, which was still under control by the government. Other 
gaps that were identified by the Russian representative was the duplication of monitoring 
efforts. Additionally, Churkin agreed with the United States that more action was needed: “it 
took our [Russian] Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State several 
months to work out an agreement, but the United States could not implement it or manage to 
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separate the moderate opposition form terrorists. It could not […] provide better conditions to 
get humanitarian aid to eastern Aleppo” (UNSC, 2016, October 8, pp. 16-17). The US 
representative already stated earlier that there was only one goal to the text and that was to stop 
the bombing of Aleppo. The airstrikes by the Russians and Syrian regime aimed to further the 
regime in Damascus. The US representative added that “Russia, as always, will offer a different 
narrative. Russia had said that it is fighting terrorism. They will probably somehow blame the 
United States of America for the suffering in Aleppo […], [but] the truth is that Russia is using 
counter-terrorism as an excuse to help the al-Assad regime” (UNSC, 2016, October 8, p. 8).  
 The year 2016 did end on a positive note. Resolution 2332 was unanimously adopted. 
The unacceptable and escalating violence in Syria was sufficient to come to a conclusion on the 
topic. All parties in the Syrian conflict, especially the Syrian authorities, should comply 
immediately to all their obligations under international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. The Council renewed the part of Resolution 2165 which authorised the 
humanitarian agencies to cross the conflict lines and monitor the loading of all humanitarian 
relief consignments (UNSC, 2016, December 21, doc). 
 
2017-2018: Still Going Strong 
With the adoption of Resolution 2393 at the end of 2017, the UNSC still formed a unity on this 
topic. The Council again renewed the authorisation for cross-border and cross-conflict-line 
humanitarian access to Syria for another 12 months. Russia did not veto the resolution, but 
together with China, abstained. The Russian representative emphasised that the authorisation 
was only meant to be a temporary measure and that continuation of the authorisation could 
impinge on Syrian sovereignty. Adding to that, the Russian representative said that a transition 
to a more traditional means of providing humanitarian assistance should be considered. This 
assistance should go in coordination with the Syrian regime and should eventually end the 
cross-border scheme. Contrary, the US representative welcomed the adoption without any 
reservation and said that 17,000 aid deliveries, monitored through the mechanism, had been 
made possible (UNSC, 2017, December 19).  
In early 2018, the Council adopted Resolution 2401 unanimously. The resolution laid 
out a 30-day cessation of hostilities to ensure a durable humanitarian pause which would enable 
weekly humanitarian aid deliveries. Despite the adoption, the US representative voiced deep 
concern about the delay in this resolution caused by the Russian delegation: “Every minute the 
Council waited on Russia, the human suffering grew” (UNSC, 2018, February 24, p. 4). The 
Russian delegation responded by stating that the immediate cessation of hostilities would be 
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impossible without the agreement of the concerned parties. Russia would like to see that 
concrete, on-the-ground agreements are made. The delegate closed his statement by expressing 
the “deep concern about the public statements by certain United States officials threatening 
aggression against Syria, a sovereign country […] [and] we demand an end to this irresponsible 
and hateful rhetoric” (UNSC, 2018, February 24, p. 6).  
 
Cooperation is Present, But for How Long? 
It becomes clear from the previous section that more cooperation between the US and Russia 
is present on this topic. Both countries have been in favour of cross-border assistance, which is 
important as cross-line aid from Damascus could be politicised. Therefore, the need of cross-
border humanitarian aid was necessary in order to provide assistance to those Syrians in need. 
Over the course of the past years, some cracks have surfaced in the cooperation between the 
US and Russia. One of the most notable things is that Russia would have liked to see more 
incorporation of the fight against ISIL in Syria. The cross-border points are, according to the 
Russians, now also used by terrorists to smuggle weapons into the country. Additionally, the 
cross-border assistance was only meant as a temporary solution. Keeping in mind these 
statements by the Russian delegation, one can conclude that necessary cooperation on the 
humanitarian aid is currently present in Syria, but that it will most likely not continue in a cross-
border and cross-line manner. The Russian delegation has already expressed its doubts and even 
abstained when voting on Resolution 2393.  
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Chapter 6: The Political Process: The Road to Peace in Syria 
From the start of the Syrian conflict, the political process in Syria has been highly debated. The 
first presidential statement on the Syrian topic in 2011 already referred to the political process. 
The UNSC affirmed its strong commitment to the “sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of Syria. It stresses that the only solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an 
inclusive and Syrian-led political process” (UNSC, 2011, August 3, p. 1, doc). Outside of the 
UNSC, certain initiatives were developed. The Geneva processes, held in 2012, 2014, 2016, 
and 2017 were aimed at the political transition of Syria. The goal of the meetings was trying to 
bring together the Syrian government and the opposition to discuss the transitional government. 
In 2012, the US already took the position that al-Assad could not be part of this transitional 
government, whereas Russia stressed that it was not yet decided who should or should not be 
in the new government. During Geneva I, Russia blocked a provision that would have called 
al-Assad to step down and to not be part of the transitional government (BBC, 2012). The 
Geneva process has so far failed in its aim to guide the political transition in Syria. In 2016, 
Russia, Iran and Turkey partly took over the Syrian peace process by launching the Astana 
talks. The representatives mainly talked about de-escalation zones or cease-fires between the 
Syrian army and rebels (France24, 2018). This chapter will look give a brief overview of the 
UNSC documents regarding the peace process. Secondly, the chapter will further elaborate on 
the developments of the peace process and how the US and Russian representatives have 
responded to that. Lastly, the continuity of the US and Russian policies will be looked at and 
an answer will be given whether there is more room for cooperation in the political peace 
process in Syria. 
 
Short Overview of UNSC Documents 
The representatives in the UNSC form different opinions on the political process and transition 
in Syria. It, therefore, took until December 2015 before a resolution was passed in the UNSC 
that discussed the transitional plan of Syria. Resolution 2254 finally overcame the gridlock on 
the Syrian transitional process that had persisted since the start of the conflict. The resolution 
was adopted unanimously and endorsed the road map for Syria’s peace process (UNSC, 2015, 
December 18, doc). After this rare show of unity among the P5 members regarding Syria’s 
transitional process, it took another year before the UNSC adopted another resolution that was 
largely dedicated to the peace process. Resolution 2336 supported the efforts made by Russia 
and Turkey in the Astana process. The resolution was unanimously adopted and was aimed to 
US-Russia Relations in the UNSC on Syria       36 
 
end the violence in Syria and created a jump-start for the political process as it included 
negotiations on a political settlement aimed at a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis. As many 
other (draft) resolutions and political statements, Resolution 2336 reaffirmed its “strong 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab 
Republic” (UNSC, 2016, December 31, p. 1, doc). These terms have been mentioned often in 
the UNSC and are underlining Russia’s main points when it comes to how the involvement of 
the UNSC in the Syrian conflict should be conducted.  
 
The Political Dossier: Small Steps are Made, Concrete Actions are Lacking 
2014: Still Not Moving Forward 
Despite the Geneva processes and the broad support of the implementation of the main outcome 
of the Geneva I and II processes, namely finding a political solution for the Syrian conflict by 
means of creating a Transitional Governing Body, concrete steps were not made. The political 
process was not moving forward in early 2014 and the actors that play a significant role, which 
are Russia, the US and Iran, are not sitting at the same table. On October 21, Western countries 
called for a renewal of the political process. The US, UK, France, Australia, and Luxembourg 
rather clearly spelled out that a role for al-Assad in future Syria was out of the question. The 
US representative stated that “more than three years ago, Bashar al-Assad lost the legitimacy 
to lead when he responded to peaceful protests with brutal violence” (UNSC, 2014, October 
21, p. 11). Ms. Power also referred to the accountability of al-Assad’s regime for the widespread 
atrocities. A long-sought solution is necessary and the influence of Iran and Russia are critical 
to that, Power added. Russia had been referring to a political solution more than often in 
previous meetings but did not further elaborate on that in this particular Council meeting. The 
Russian representative did, however, condemn the airstrikes in Syria against the terrorists. The 
airstrikes were executed on Syrian soil without the consent of the Syrian government. Russia 
believed that the anti-terrorism efforts should be taken in compliance with international law 
(UNSC, 2014, October 21).  
 
2015: A Breakthrough  
The year 2015 started off on a more positive note. In the first debate of 2015, the Russian 
representative stated that the military option to overthrow the Syrian regime had not been 
justified and that the only way to end the conflict is through dialogue. New intra-Syrian 
consultations were planned for later in January in Moscow in which the Syrian government and 
opposition could have direct talks on equal footing. Several UNSC members applauded this 
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Russian initiative. The US, however, once again stressed the importance of accountability 
regarding al-Assad and the individuals that surrounded him (UNSC, 2015, January 15). Despite 
these efforts, the humanitarian situation in Syria continued to be dire and improvement of the 
living conditions of the Syrian people was dependent on a political solution. The international 
community had to strive forward and continue to collaborate in order to find a solution. Finally, 
at the end of 2015, the UNSC had a breakthrough. Resolution 2254 was unanimously adopted. 
The resolution set out a road map for the peace process in Syria and provided a timetable for 
the UN-facilitated talks between the representatives of the Syrian government and the 
opposition. In addition, it outlined a nationwide ceasefire. The only condition to this ceasefire 
is that it would only be initiated once the concerned parties had taken the first steps towards 
political transition. The Council expresses its support for “a Syrian-led political process that is 
facilitated by the United Nations and […] [that] established credible, inclusive and non-
sectarian governance” (UNSC, 2015, December 15, p. 2, doc). Both the US and Russia 
presented gratitude to each other. The US representative especially thanked Foreign Minister 
Lavrov for his collaboration and efforts in both of the Vienna conferences. In return, Lavrov 
thanked Secretary of State Kerry for his initiative to convene the meeting of the International 
Syria Support Group. Lavrov referred to the Vienna conference as the sole platform that unites 
all the influential external actors regarding the Syrian crisis. Kerry confirmed that a broadly 
supported process was needed and that this resolution should put Syria on the road to political 
transition (UNSC, 2015, December 15). 
 
2016: Failing to Implement Resolution 2254 
Despite the success at the end of 2015, the implementation of Resolution 2254 did not start off 
smoothly. In October 2016, two draft resolutions were tabled: draft resolution 846 was vetoed 
by Russia, whereas draft resolution 847, which was the initiation of Russia, was not adopted at 
all. The atmosphere during this Council meeting was bitter. The UNSC members were pointing 
fingers to the other members instead of realising how severe the situation in Aleppo was and 
that something had to be done. Words did not seem enough to illustrate the mutual disgust. The 
common manners in the UNSC slowly crumbled. To illustrate, the Russian representative only 
thanked the countries that did not criticise Russia after Russia’s interventions during the 
meeting. This goes against all regular norms in the UNSC. The Russian representative 
underlined that Russia’s draft resolution was a political demonstration aimed at keeping the 
multilateral formats alive. Churkin stated that the failure to adopt this resolution was guided by 
anti-Russian sentiments or that countries simply did not have the courage to have a positive 
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vote. In return, the US representative stated that the fight against terrorism was used as an 
excuse by al-Assad and his allies to kill anybody who is in the way of their military objectives. 
Additionally, Russia was called a thug: “Russia has become one of the chief purveyors of terror 
in Aleppo, using tactics more commonly associated with thugs than Governments. Russia and 
the Al-Assad regime think the world will look the other way if they recite the word “counter-
terrorism”” (UNSC, 2016, October 8, p. 8). The US representative stated that the Russian draft 
resolution was a deceptive attempt to get the international community to ratify Russia and al-
Assad’s actions. Russia denounced that this meeting was a waste of time as none of the two 
draft resolutions tabled had any chance to be adopted (UNSC, 2016, October 8).  
On December 5, 2016, draft resolution 1026 was vetoed by Russia and China. Before 
the vote, Russia surprised by stating that it would veto the resolution on procedural grounds 
instead of veto the resolution on its content. In addition, it stated that the draft resolution does 
not refer to a withdrawal of fighters from eastern Aleppo but to an immediate cessation of 
hostilities. The Russian representative was afraid that the danger of the regrouping of the rebels 
and resupplying was too high (UNSC, 2016, December 5). Implicitly, one could argue that 
Russia supported a military victory over a political resolution. Moreover, Russia believed that 
the vote came too early. This in light of previous steps the Americans and Russians made during 
negotiations about Aleppo in Rome earlier that month. The US denied this by stating that a 
clear solution was not found in Rome. Russia had made vague commitments about a deal. 
However, so far, these commitments have always led to a new round of bombardments in Syria. 
The US did not want to allow that Russia would be stating these vague promises again and that 
therefore Russia was buying time. Finally, the US representative stated that this situation is a 
cynical act. The resolution was rather simple as it concerned a brief humanitarian pause to aid 
the citizens of Aleppo. According to the US representative, the Russians said “No, the Security 
Council cannot help you” to the Syrian citizens. The US claimed that “Russia, together with its 
ally, Bashar al-Assad, will keep bombing these people instead” (UNSC, 2016, December 5, p. 
10). A week later, the Russians accused the US, France, and the UK of their propaganda, 
disinformation and fake news (UNSC, 2016, December 13).  
 
2017-2018: No Political Solution in Sight 
The trend continued in 2017 and 2018. The US stated at the end of 2017 that it remained 
committed to Resolution 2254 as the “sole legitimate blueprint for a political resolution to this 
conflict” (UNSC, 2017, December 19, p. 3). The US representative also reaffirmed its support 
for the Geneva process as this was, according to the US, the only framework that would be a 
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viable option for the Syrian political process. No such statement was made by the Russians 
during this particular meeting (UNSC, 2017, December 19). On January 23, 2018, an ad-hoc 
meeting was called for by the Russian delegation to discuss the use of chemical weapons. The 
US called this a new political stunt by Russia that is purely meant to distract the attention from 
the for Russia uncomfortable truth regarding the Syrian conflict: the irrefutable proof that the 
al-Assad regime had used chemical weapons against Syria’s own civilians. When these facts 
surfaced, Russia always remained rather quiet or tried to doubt the proof and deviated the 
attention from the facts. This was all to still support the al-Assad regime, according to the US 
representative (UNSC, 2018, January 23). The US is accusing the Russians of their support to 
al-Assad. This also stands in the way of a solution to peaceful process as these accusations have 
formed the basis of the negotiations in the past months and even years.  
 
A Peaceful Syria: A Long Road Ahead 
The political peace process started off slowly in the UNSC. However, with the adoption of 
Resolution 2254 hope returned and the unity of the UNSC regarding this topic showed that a 
political transitional process was possible. Nevertheless, the implementation of the resolution 
proved to be more difficult. Despite the commitment of the UNSC to still implement the 
solutions that are in the resolution, concrete and successful practical steps have not been made. 
One of the main hurdles in the UNSC is the position of al-Assad in this transitional process. 
The US wants to hold al-Assad accountable for his actions and does not incorporate him in 
Syria’s future. This position has been made clear throughout the discussions in the UNSC 
regarding the political process. Contrarily, the Russians oppose this viewpoint. They refrain 
from voting in favour of any resolution that would state that al-Assad cannot be part of the 
political process. Discussions on this topic have been rather heated and throughout these past 
years accusations at the US and Russian address have intensified. As long as there is no 
agreement on the position of al-Assad, it would be very challenging to have a unified voice in 
the UNSC on the Syrian political and peace process. This dossier has proven to be the most 
challenging one and the viewpoints of the US and Russia are too diverging. The relationship 
between the two countries could suffer from their disagreement and it puts a standstill on further 
positive developments and solutions regarding Syria’s peace process.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The Syrian conflict has been raging since 2011. While the international community closely 
watches the horrors that still unfold in Syria, some action has been taken in the UNSC. 
However, more cooperation on the topic is required in order to stop the atrocities in Syria. The 
rise of anti-immigrant and xenophobic parties in Europe, the homelessness of many Syrians and 
the grand humanitarian disaster that is present are all consequences of the raging war. This 
thesis aimed to investigate how the relationship between the US and Russia is in the UNSC 
through the lens of the Syrian conflict. This conclusion will provide an answer to that and also 
discusses the limitations to this research and provides suggestions for future research. 
 The UNSC has initiated several initiatives that would investigate the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria. Both the US and Russia agreed in the early stages after the chemical attacks 
that the perpetrators have to be held accountable. With JIM, the UNSC hoped to gather more 
information on the chemical attacks in Syria. However, the Russians doubted the outcomes and 
believed that the information was not objective and impartial. In addition, the Russian 
representative interpreted that the report was too one-sided and too focused on the al-Assad 
regime. Cooperating on this dossier proved to be difficult and Russia vetoed the draft resolution 
that would renew the mandate of JIM. As long as the two parties cannot agree on how the 
process of accountability of the perpetrators should be conducted, it would be difficult to come 
to further agreements. Russia’s policies have been rather consistent throughout the years, 
whereas we can see a turning point in the US policy when Trump became president. 
Nevertheless, he has been criticised for his inconsistencies regarding the response to chemical 
warfare in Syria and his flip-flopping forms a weak basis for the development of a strong US 
foreign policy regarding this issue (Bentley, 2017). 
 Taking into account the cooperation on the other dossiers, the collaboration between the 
US and Russia on humanitarian assistance is more present. Both countries agreed on cross-line 
and cross-border assistance. Nevertheless, draft resolutions that included a cessation of 
hostilities and that would allow more humanitarian assistance on the ground, have not always 
been adopted. The US has been consistent on this policy and often referred to the importance 
of the assistance by the international community to aid the Syrians. Russia has supported cross-
border assistance so far – at least until June 2018 – but new doubts may initiate a new take on 
this policy.  
Cooperation on the last dossier, the political level, proved to be the most challenging. 
Only one resolution that is in large parts dedicated to the political transition and peace process 
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in Syria has passed. Despite the talks in Geneva, Astana, and Vienna, the implementation of 
Resolution 2254 has been challenging. From the start, the US and Russia have been clear on 
their policies regarding al-Assad’s position. Both countries have made this a breaking point. If 
they do not find a solution together, then a political transition in Syria is unlikely in the near 
future. What has also become evident from the data, is that the political process, humanitarian 
situation and the use of chemical weapons are often intertwined. For instance, the US often 
referred to the humanitarian situation and the need for assistance when discussing the use of 
chemical weapons. A clear line in these topics would most likely spark more collaboration.  
 All in all, with regards to the Syrian conflict, the US and Russia seem to agree on a 
broader level, but filling in the details proves to be problematic. Cooperation is evident, but in 
order to end the Syrian conflict, collaboration on the specifics is necessary. As the years 
progressed, the representatives of the US and Russia have disagreed increasingly during the 
UNSC meetings. It led to pointing fingers: accusations were made and arguments that the other 
party obstructed the road to peace or stability surfaced more than once. These heated 
discussions have not been fruitful for the relations of the US and Russia. Nevertheless, Trump 
and Putin tried to come closer on this topic during the Helsinki Summit of July 2018 and 
discussed, among other things, the reconstruction of Syria (Wintour, 2018b). With 13 vetoes 
on the Syrian topic, rapprochement continues to be vital. The Helsinki Summit showed that 
more cooperation is possible, but it yet remains to be seen whether these public announcements 
have an impact on the UNSC outcomes regarding the Syrian conflict.  
 Moreover, the level of US involvement in the Syrian crisis is also dependent on 
individuals. It matters who holds the presidency. For example, the Obama administration 
focused more on solving the Syrian crisis diplomatically, whereas the Trump administration 
engaged more militarily. Obama’s hesitance for military involvement was born out of the 
perceived Bush legacy. In addition, the inconsistency of the presidents also plays a part. To 
illustrate, at the end of 2018, Trump announced the complete withdrawal of the US soldiers in 
Syria as, according to Trump, ISIL was defeated. However, this idea was later killed and a 
remaining force would continue to be present in Syria (NOS, 2019). Trump’s Syria policy 
continues to be incoherent and unclear. Other individuals that can be seen as intervening 
variables and who have some sort of agency are the US ambassadors to the UN. For example, 
Nikki Haley already announced that the US would level new sanctions after the Douma attacks 
in April 2018. The new sanctions would target Russian companies that helped in the chemical 
weapons program of the Syrian regime. According to the White House, Haley got ahead of 
herself and overstepped as the US was only considering additional sanctions (Diamond, Liptak, 
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Collins, & Labott, 2018). These individual statements and policies can affect the dynamics of 
the Syrian conflict.  
 Lastly, this research had some limitations. Not all UNSC documents on terrorism or 
chemical weapons were publicly accessible. Therefore, this data set has been excluded from the 
analysis. If the documents are accessible in the future, then more research could include these 
topics to grasp the US and Russian positions on chemical weapons in an even more detailed 
way. This thesis did also not delve into the relations of the US and Russia concerning Israel and 
Iran. In one of the UNSC meetings, Haley mentioned that more discussion is necessary within 
the UNSC on Iran’s destabilising presence in Syria (UNSC, 2018, May 15). The US protection 
of Israel and the attempt to limit the power of Iran could be the real reason behind the US 
involvement in Syria. This topic can be further explored in future research by for instance 
looking at the developments, discussions, and resolutions regarding UNDOF – the United 
Nations Disengagement Observer Force. Moreover, future research analyses the public 
statements of Trump and Putin regarding the Syrian conflict. The UNSC proved to be a good 
starting point to investigate the relations and tensions between the US and Russia, but due to 
the diplomatic character of the meetings, the public statements could be an interesting addition. 
As of now, the individual actors, who are less constrained by the structures in the Syrian 
conflict, do not have the strong will of solving the war. It is a continuous circus of confrontation.  
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